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We take a first pass at quantifying the magnitudes of debt relief achieved through default and 
restructuring in two distinct samples: 1979-2010, focusing on credit events in emerging markets, and 
1920-1939, documenting the official debt hangover in advanced economies that was created by World 
War I and its aftermath. We examine the economic performance of debtor countries during and after these 
overhang episodes, by tracing the evolution of real per capita GDP (levels and growth rates); sovereign 
credit ratings; debt servicing burdens relative to GDP, fiscal revenues, and exports; as well as the level of 
government debt (external and total). Across 45 crisis episodes for which data is available we find that 
debt relief averaged 21 percent of GDP for advanced economies (1932-1939) and 16 percent of GDP for 
emerging markets (1979-2010), respectively. The economic landscape after a final debt reduction is 
characterized by higher income levels and growth, lower debt servicing burdens and lower government 
debt. Also ratings recover markedly, albeit only in the modern period. 
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Introduction 
“When I was a youngster growing up in South Dakota, we never referred to the national debt, it was 
always referred to as the war debt because it stemmed from World War I.” 
George McGovern2  
 
 Before the subprime financial crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, academic and policy 
discussions on the topic of debt relief were almost exclusively directed toward initiatives for the highly 
indebted poorest countries (HIPC).3 Advanced economies, apparently, had outgrown volatile business 
cycles and financial crises. Sovereign debt crises were a distant memory for them.4 Emerging markets, 
having weathered the turbulence of 1994-2003, were also on the mend, helped along by a favorable 
external environment of low and stable international interest rates and robust commodity prices. The 
debts of the First World War and the controversial defaults by nearly all advanced economies from 1932 
to 1934 were an intellectual curiosity with little relevance to current circumstances. 
The global financial crisis and its aftermath (which still lingers) abruptly disrupted that tranquility 
setting and the accompanying complacency. New restructurings in Greece returned after a hiatus of nearly 
80 years (the last Greek default started in 1932 and ended in 1966). The ongoing depression in periphery 
Europe has already surpassed the economic collapse of the 1930s by some markers, with unemployment 
rates reaching levels not seen since that era. In most advanced economies, record private debt overhangs 
are only slowly unwinding, while the steady upward march in public debts continues unabated. The broad 
subject of sovereign debt crises and the role of debt write-offs in their resolution is no longer a matter 
solely of academic interest. 
Research until now has been mostly devoted to documenting the incidence of external and 
domestic default, various features of their causes, and the macroeconomic panorama surrounding them.  
2 BrainyQuote.com Web site: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/georgemcgo462619.html 
3 See, for example, Chauvin and Kraay (2005) for a skeptical view of the benefits of debt forgiveness for low- 
income countries, as well as the welfare analysis by Dias, Richmond and Wright (2013).   
4 See Stock and Watson (2002) on the Great Moderation and the reduced volatility of output. 
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This paper provides a first pass at quantifying the magnitudes of debt relief achieved and the subsequent 
economic performance of the debtors.  
We follow two complementary strands of analysis. One focuses on the highly varied credit events 
in the middle-high income emerging markets in the modern era. Recent work by Cruces and Trebesch 
(2013, henceforth C&T), which is in line with the approach developed in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
(2006), provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of haircuts on sovereign debt for practically the 
universe of emerging market restructuring episodes from 1978 to 2010.5 We look at these haircuts not 
from their vantage point of the investor, but from our perspective of debt relief to the borrower.  
The second strand extends our earlier work, bringing to the dissection table crises episodes that 
are comparatively understudied. Specifically, we turn our attention to the interwar debt hangover of 
official (government to government) debt created by World War I and its aftermath.6 We have quantified 
and studied the amounts and details of the large network of war-related official debts for 18 advanced 
economies. This allows us to estimate the extent of debt relief in this episode for the first time. 
The war debt rescheduling and relief has many parallels to the developing country debt crisis and 
debt relief initiatives, in particular the Brady deals of the 1990s. Box 1 provides a thumbnail comparison 
of three international episodes: the 1920s/1930s, the 1980s/1990s and post-2007. As with bank loans in 
the 1970s and 1980s, war debts were the dominant type of indebtedness for many advanced countries in 
the 1920s. 7 Just as for many emerging markets in the 1980s, much of the 1920s and 1930s were a “lost 
decade (s)” for European countries. Much of the international policy discourse of that time was an 
ongoing debate on the need for debt relief. As was the case in the mid-1980s, there were preliminary 
rescheduling agreements in the early 1920s, which postponed the repayment of war related debts for more 
than 10 years, but without a reduction in the nominal debt burden (Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932). Finally, 
5 See also the comprehensive study by Benjamin and Wright (2009). 
6 The literature on default is primarily about private creditors and sovereign borrowers; World War I debt and 
reparations are about official creditors and sovereign borrowers. 
7 Ahamed (2010) often harks back to the war debt overhang theme. 
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just as in the early 1990s, the war debt overhang was resolved by widespread and large-scale default and 
debt relief. This explicit debt reduction was a central way to cope with Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation 
spiral, thus complementing the devaluation and inflation events importantly.  
Box 1. Selected Features of International Debt Overhang Episodes 
 
There are also parallels between todays public and private debt overhangs in advanced economies 
and those of the post WWI era (see Box 1). During the 1930s, concerns about the debt burdens 
intensified, especially after country after country succumbed to systemic financial crises during 1929-
1931 and protracted economic depression. Since the onset of the subprime crisis in 2007, the nature of the 
debt overhang has also evolved markedly. What were predominantly private debts prior to and at the time 
of the global financial crisis have now become official or public debts. Both the modern and the 1920-
1920/1930s Defaults 1980s/1990s Debt Crisis 2007 Subprime and its Aftermath
Characterisation "Lost Decade" in Developing Countries
Scope of debt 
overhang
Type of debt overhang
Advanced Economies:
Emerging Markets:
Early policy measures       
Hoover Moratorium /w US 1931
Lausanne Agreement /w UK 1932
By the 1930s, following a wave of 
banking crises, encompassing both 
advanced and emerging economies 
Largely confined to emerging markets 
and developing countries. Most hard-
hitting for Africa and Latin America 
Generalized default 1934                       
(unilateral debt write-offs follow) 
Late policy measures 
(crisis resolution)
1982-1985 repeated debt rollovers and 
bridge loans, 1986-1989 Baker Plan: 
maturity extensions of up to 30 years 
(no debt write-offs)
1923-1930, war debt settlements with 
US and UK: maturity extensions of up 
to 60 years (no debt write-offs) 
Brady debt relief initiative 1990-1997 
(negotiated debt reduction)
Rescheduling of offical debts: maturity 
extensions of up to 40 years. Overhang yet 
to be resolved
Advanced economy crisis most acutely 
felt in periphery Europe, where the 
contraction extends 5-6 years
Recurrig parallels ot Latin America's and 
Japan's lost decades. Emerging theme of 
'Secular Stagnation'
Pre-crisis surge in private domestic and 
external borrowing, largely driven by 
household and financial sector debts.           
Post-crisis surge in public and publicly-
guaranteed debt.
Large-scale socialization of private debts 
(bank bailouts). Public debt write-offs 
confined to Greece. Emergence of 
significant official lending. Limited 
private-sector write-offs (except US)
1920s:  Largely government-to-
government war and reconstruction 
loans (external foreign currency debt)
1930s:  Build-up of additional 
domestic public debt associated with 
economic drepession.
Public and private external debts 
predominantly to private creditors
Legacy of WWI; "Lost Generation" 
and economic dislocation
Public and private borrowers, largely 
private creditors (predominantly 
banks). Crisis follows 1970s 
commodity boom and capital flows 
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1930s episodes are synchronous, affecting many advanced economies simultaneously. Moreover, in all 
three episodes the importance of official debts increased markedly from the beginning of the crisis.  
Eichengreen and Portes’ (1986) study the interwar years with the aim of explaining the incidence 
of sovereign default (on private creditors) and characterizing the performance of rates of returns on 
sovereign bonds. We follow their advice on the direction of future research: 
“A further omission especially relevant to our analysis of default is the treatment of war debts 
and reparations generally and the 1931 Hoover Moratorium in particular. 
Another intriguing issue we have not yet begun to address is the relationship of default to the 
subsequent economic performance of borrowing countries.” 
 
We assess the magnitude, scope and timing of debt relief for the advanced economies in the 
1930s (with a primary focus on war debts) and the emerging markets post 1979. Our strategy of studying 
in parallel events and economic outcomes in advanced and emerging market economies is along the lines 
of Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), who examine the antecedents and immediate aftermath of banking, 
currency, and debt crises. Our time frame of analysis is complementary to theirs, as we are interested in 
the patterns surrounding the eventual exit from debt crises. The indicators analyzed in the post-debt-relief 
period include: real per capita GDP (levels and growth rates); sovereign credit ratings, including Fitch, 
Moodys and Institutional Investors; debt servicing burdens (interest and amortization) relative to GDP, 
GNI, revenues, and exports; external debt (public plus private) for emerging markets; total, external, and 
domestic central government debt relative to GDP, GNI, and exports.   
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
Across 45 default and restructuring episodes over 1932-1939 and 1979-2010 for which we have 
the required data, debt relief averaged 21 and 16 percent of GDP for advanced economies and middle-
high-income emerging markets, respectively; these estimates represent a lower bound on the true 
magnitude of debt relief. 
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The size of the advanced economy debt write-downs (relative to GDP) arising from the 1932-
1934 defaults on World War I debt are not dissimilar from the estimates for the post-1970 middle-high 
income emerging market defaults and restructurings.   
The cumulative average increase in per capita GDP over the four years following a decisive 
restructuring or default is 9 and 16 percent for the emerging markets and advanced economies, 
respectively. Decisive refers to the default or the last write down in a sequence - “restructuring to end all 
restructurings.” In the case of World War I Debt, the June 15, 1934 default settled the matter for that 
episode; for the emerging market cases, it is the last restructuring that marks the exit from default status.8 
The incidence of a marked pick-up in economic activity following a debt write-down is 
widespread. Of the 47 combined advanced and emerging market episodes for which we have per capita 
real GDP data, 39 (83 percent) expanded from T to T+4. In six of the remaining eight cases, real per 
capita GDP was flat (defined as less than or equal to a one percent change in either direction) post-
restructuring; and two episodes out of 47 had a significant decline in real per capita GDP. 
On the question of capital market access, we look for patterns in the evolution of sovereign credit 
ratings post default. Here the interwar experience departs considerably from the emerging market (1979-
2010) outcomes. 
For the emerging market episodes over 1979-2010, we examine Institutional Investor Sovereign 
Ratings (IIR) for 30 episodes for which there is full data. The average increases (improvement) in the IIR 
index are 22 percent after two years and 38 percent after four years.   
For 7 of the episodes (23 percent), the cumulative increase in the IIR from T to T+4 is in excess 
of 60 percent. This pattern of recovery is broadly consistent with the findings in Gelos, Sahay, and 
8 In a significant number of instances there is only a single restructuring. However, there are numerous default spells 
where the number of restructurings ranges from two to eight. 
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Sandleris (2011), who conclude market access following default comes swiftly (well within the four year 
window examined here).  
The single lowest IIR reading at T+4 was Ecuador’s (about 10 percent lower than when it exited 
from default in 1995). 9 But this negative outcome was not because Ecuador remained shut out of capital 
markets since its “final” Brady Plan restructuring but rather because it was quick to re-leverage after the 
restructuring by 1998 (T+4), Ecuador was heading for a new debt crisis in 1999-2000.10 
Debt service burdens (amortizations plus interest payments) as a share of: GDP, GNI, central 
government revenues, or exports decline following a restructuring. For the war debt default episodes, the 
ratio of debt service to revenues falls from an average of about 34 percent in the late 1920s to about 24 
percent a decade later. For the emerging markets (1979-2010), debt servicing declines in advance of the 
“final restructuring,” as often there are multiple debt reduction efforts prior to the exit from default.  The 
decline is most pronounced in debt service-to-exports ratio, which drops from 37 percent in the three 
years prior to default to 19 percent in the three years after exiting from default. We caution that even in 
the absence of haircuts, external factors could account for some of the observed reduction in debt 
servicing. Specifically, there is a sustained trend decline in real international interest rates following the 
abrupt spike in 1979 through mid-1982.   
On the question of whether the debt write-downs actually reduced debt, we focus primarily on 
external debt and compare the advanced economy and emerging market experience over a nine-year span 
from four years before default (restructuring) to four years afterwards. For the advanced economies, we 
examine external (foreign) central government debt/GDP. The selection of external debt is warranted by 
the fact that the war debts were external debt arrangements among sovereign governments. For the 
emerging markets, the haircut calculus from Cruces and Trebesch (2013) is also for external credit events.  
9 There are a total of 3 of the 30 cases (including Ecuador) where the rating was below what it was at the time of the 
last restructuring. 
10 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) on this phenomenon and the subsection entitled Did default or 
restructuring reduce the debt? this paper. 
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On average (across 35 advanced economy and emerging market episodes for which we have complete 
debt data), external debt/ GDP or GNI falls 19 percentage points over the nine-year window. There is a 
vast range in variation in the debt outcomes, ranging from a cumulative debt reduction of 125 percent of 
GDP or GNI to a debt build-up of 37 percent.  
Two additional observations: First, the number of countries which record deleveraging is 
considerably higher (27 episodes) than the tally of those ending up with a higher level of external debt (7 
episodes).11  Second, the outcomes corresponding to the advanced economies are not clustered in a 
particular range and, indeed, their experience is distributed similarly to that of emerging markets.  As 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find, the patterns seen in emerging and advanced economies' crises are 
qualitatively similar, except that emerging market credit ratings were penalized more heavily at the time 
of default.12 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section we describe the methodology, data 
requirements and other conceptual issues while Section III introduces the advanced economies and 
emerging market restructuring and default episodes that are the centerpiece of the paper. Section IV is 
devoted to the comparisons of the modern emerging market experiences with the defaults on war debt of 
the 1930s. Concluding remarks discuss related policy issues and scope for research in this area while 
appendices present supplementary material. 
II. Concepts and Methodology 
 In the remainder of this section, we provide: (1) definitions for the concepts employed throughout 
the analysis (be it the type of sovereign crisis, the type of debt, creditor types, etc.); (2) a sketch of our 
basic methodology to calculate the magnitude of debt relief associated with a default or a restructuring; 
11 The US shows no change in external debt, as it did not have any external debt over this sample. Altogether this 
brings the total number of advanced and emerging market episodes to 35. The 1934 abrogation of the gold clause is 
the only domestic restructuring episode in out sample. 
12 Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) cover banking, currency, and debt crises over 1973 to 2010. This offers ample 
opportunity for the comparison of banking and currency crises in EMs and advanced economies. In this window, 
however, debt crises are confined to emerging markets; the inclusion of the 1930s defaults in advanced economies 
extends the comparison in an important dimension. 
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(3) a brief description of data requirements and their respective sources. A Data Appendix completes the 
task of providing individual sources in greater detail.  
1. Default, restructuring spells, and other concepts 
  Box 2 provides a compact definition and commentary on the main events studied in this paper—
specifically, sovereign debt crises. All the episodes (with a single exception) that are introduced in 
Section III and analyzed in the remainder of the paper fall into the category of sovereign external debt 
crises, as defined in Box 2. The aforementioned exception is a sovereign domestic crisis, which is the 
category that the United States’ January 1934 haircut falls into, as it was confined to debt issued by the 
United States Treasury under domestic law (it also happened that the debt was held almost exclusively by 
domestic residents, and denominated in domestic currency, although prior to the haircut, it was linked to 
gold). 
 Within the realm of external sovereign debt crisis, we deal with two distinct varieties: The most 
common variety involves private creditors and sovereign borrowers. This type of credit event, in its many 
guises, captures the episodes of 1979-2010 in emerging markets.  The other variety involves official 
creditors (specifically sovereign governments) lending to other sovereign governments.  The episodes 
covered in the interwar sample (World War I and reconstruction debts) fall into this category.  To be 
clear, in light of the severe financial crises and economic depression of the 1930s, there were many 
episodes of default and restructuring involving private creditors as well—but these are not the focal point 
of our study (we refer to these to the extent that they overlap or interact with the settlement of the war 
debt).13 
 Box 2 also defines some of the timing conventions used in our analysis. On other conventions, we 
use the term default and restructuring interchangeably, as the latter is a partial default (a haircut), and, as 
described in Box 2, a restructuring changes the terms of the original contract to terms less favorable to the 
13 See, for instance, Eichengreen and Portes, (1986) and (1990), Eichengreen, (1992). 
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creditor. Rating agencies also treat restructurings in this manner. Before turning to out methodology for 
estimating the size of debt relief in each default spell, a few more definitions on debt types will clarify our 
choices of data. 
As our debt crises are predominantly external, we focus primarily (but not exclusively) on 
external debt. In terms of borrowers, external debt can be public, publicly guaranteed, or private (which 
does not necessarily mean it is not ultimately guaranteed also). As to lenders, these can be official 
(sovereign governments), multilateral institutions (League of Nations, International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, etc.), or private creditors.  
The interwar component of our analysis is focused on public debt, more precisely, external (or 
foreign) public debt (this refers to central government debt in all cases except Italy where general 
government debt is used). External public debt is where the war debt was housed, unless we note 
otherwise. 14 Over 1920-1939, we also examine the evolution of central government domestic and total 
debt, as default on war debt brought about important changes in the composition of the public sector 
balance sheet. 
In the emerging market episodes, we also work with more than one time series. The estimated 
haircuts are based on public and public guaranteed debt from private creditors (excluding IMF loans, 
official loans, etc.). To ascertain the larger macroeconomic picture around restructurings, we also trace 




14 For example, in the case of Italy, since March 1926, the service of the war debt was relegated to the Autonomous 
Fund of the War debts. Where possible, we keep a track record of how the War debt and its service is integrated in 
the public sector accounts. 
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Box 1. Crisis, Default, and Timing Definitions 
 










debt crisis  
 
A sovereign default is defined as the 
failure to meet a principal or interest 
payment on the due date (or within the 
specified grace period).  These episodes 
also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is ultimately 
extinguished in terms less favorable 
than the original obligation. 
An external sovereign default involves 
debt that is classified as external 
because it was issued under foreign 
law. Usually (but not always) such debt 
is denominated in a foreign currency 




In this study, we have two types of external 
debt crises:  Defaults of debts between 
governments (this encompasses World War I 
debt and reparations payments) and private 
sector lending to official borrowers or to 
institutions that are publicly guaranteed (the 
emerging market defaults or restructurings 
fall into this category). 
Domestic 
sovereign 
debt crisis  
The definition given above for external 
debt applies, except these episodes 
cover debt issued under domestic law. 
Such debt may be denominated in 
domestic or foreign currency and held 
by either residents or nonresidents. 
Domestic debt crises have also often 
involved the freezing of bank deposits 
and or forcible conversions of such 
deposits from dollars to local currency. 
 
The US 1934 abrogation of the gold clause is 
the only domestic debt crisis we examine. 
In line with the definition above, the 
delinking from gold meant that the debt was 
“ultimately extinguished in terms less 
favorable than the original obligation.” 
T In this study we define T as the year of 
the final restructuring or default; the 
year of the last debt relief in that 
default spell. 
For WWI defaults, T=1934 for all debtor 
countries, while debt relief began in 1931 
with the Hoover Moratorium, the WWI debt 
issue was not resolved until the June 15 
across the board default. From that date, only 
Finland made payments on the War debt. 
1934 would not be the final date if we were 
focused on default episodes on private 
creditors. For example, Germany did not 
reach its final restructuring until 1952. 
For emerging market episodes, T is the date 
of the final restructuring that marks the exit 
from default. For instance, Mexico defaulted 
in August 1982 (start of the default spell); it 
had six restructuring deals between the start 
date (1982) and 1990 the date of the final 





2. Haircuts and debt relief 
 It is quite common in our sample to see multiple debt reduction efforts in consecutive years (in 
some years there may even be more than one restructuring); these are not, in our estimation, separate debt 
crises but the same lingering unresolved one, which can go on for a decade and longer. Many developing 
countries went through a series of debt restructurings throughout the 1980s before finally resolving the 
crisis in the 1990s. Similarly, we find that the war debt and reconstruction loans owed to the US and the 
UK had been renegotiated in almost all debtor countries prior to the defaults of 1934 (see below, and 
Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932, for an overview). Also the recent Greek restructuring has been a multi-year 
ongoing process, as documented in Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati (2013). Here, our interest is to 
quantify the magnitude of debt relief of the entire default spell rather than that of individual deals.  
The database on haircuts constructed by C&T (2013) presents, for each restructuring deal, the 
amount of debt affected as well as two measures of the haircut agreed upon in each deal. Their approach 
follows a series of papers by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, 2007 and 2008), who focus on eight 
case studies of more recent crises. This information, along with the corresponding US dollar GDP figures 
for the corresponding years, is shown in Appendix Table B1 for a total of 97 individual restructuring 
deals in the 30 middle-high income countries we study over 1978-2010.  From this information, a 
cumulative haircut measure for the entire default spell is (see C&T, 2013 Appendix p. 3) and synopsis 
below.15 16  The default spell dates are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Thus, the 97 individual 
restructurings correspond to 35 default spells in 30 countries. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and 
Uruguay had two separate default episodes or spells; Ecuador had three. 
15 Source: C&T (2013) https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/research. 
16 In effect, in the same spirit of C&T (2013) two cumulative haircut estimates can be derived; the first is based on 
the “preferred” haircut measure for each successive restructuring and a market cumulative measure, which replaces 
the preferred haircut measure with the market calculation.  
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The cumulative effective haircut can be interpreted as the compound losses of a passive investor 
who held a face value-weighted basket of all the country’s securities and whose debts are restructured 
sequentially in each deal up to and including the final deal. For the final deal i this measure is: 
(1) Cumulative Effective 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 1 - ∏ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1  
Where  𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the wealth conservation ratio in restructuring j, and 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖-1 is the number of non-final 
deals preceding final deal i. 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is defined as: 
         (2) 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖  (1 −𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) + �1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 � = 1 - Effective 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  
The wealth conservation ratio is 1 minus the effective haircut and draws on GFD data to private creditors. 
To calculate debt relief for a full spell (up to and including the final restructuring), DRi, we 
calculate the following two ratios, which we refer to as Method 1 and 2, respectively: 
         (3) DRi,METHOD 1  = Cumulative Effective 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖   
Method 2, rather than scaling by final period GDP (which could bias downward the relative importance of 
earlier restructuring deals assuming nominal GDP is rising over the spell), would be: 
       (4) DRi,METHOD 2  = Cumulative Effective 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 ∑  𝒋𝒋=𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋=𝟏𝟏  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗  
A sample calculation for Argentina 1982-1993, tracing out the effects of successive cumulative haircuts 
over a lengthy (but typical of the debt crisis of the 1980s) default episode, is available from the authors 
upon request.   
For the war debt defaults, as the entire stock of debt was written off, we work with the 
outstanding stock of debt as a share of GDP as our preferred estimate of the haircut. Consistent with C&T 
(2013) we add unpaid interest and principal arrears to the debt stock. In addition to this face value haircut, 
we compute present value haircuts on the war debt based on the contractually agreed principal and 
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interest payments of the restructuring agreements of the 1920s. The exact terms for each country are taken 
from the original debt agreements, reprinted in the authoritative study on war debts by Moulton and 
Pasvolsky (1932). Specifically, we use the terms for the reprofiling agreements of US war debt with 
Austria (May 1930), Belgium (August 1925), Czechoslovakia (October 1925), Estonia (October 1925), 
Finland (May 1923), France (April 1926), Great Britain (June 1923), Greece (May 1925), Hungary (April 
1924), Italy (November 1925), Latvia (September 1925), Lithuania (September 1924), Poland (November 
1925), Poland (November 1924), Romania (December 1925), and Yugolsavia (May 1926). For the UK 
war debt we use the terms of the settlements of Belgium (December 1925), France (July 1926), Greece 
(April 1927), Italy (January 1926), Portugal (December 1926), Romania (October 1935), and Yugolsavia 
(1927).17 For all future payments, we use a 5% annual discount rate, which follows the approach chosen 
in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). 
3. Data and sources  
 Our comparisons involve two distinct eras separated by forty years; 1920-1939 and 1979-2010. 
The interwar defaults are about wartime official debts rather than peacetime private lending. Studying 
these two groups of necessarily requires a broad array of databases and an even broader collection of 
sources. While a Data Appendix provides greater detail, the major data sources are briefly introduced in 
Box 3.  
In addition to the sources associated with the time series used in this study, there are also 
important sources used to build the chronology of events surrounding the interwar settlement of war debt 
that are presented in the next section. Annual League of Nations World Economic Surveys covering 1931-
1940 are invaluable sources. Pick and Sedillot (1971) and United Nations (1948) figure as prominently 
useful. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Reinhart (2010) date the credit events. 
  
17 We could not yet gather details on the agreements of Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal on their debt owed to 
the United Kingdom. We are therefore not able to compute present value debt relief estimates for these cases. 
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Box 3. Variable List and Main Data Sources 
 
 
Haircuts and Affected debt: For interwar calculations, important (but not exhaustive) sources are Bailey (1950), 
League of Nations (various issues), Lloyd (1934), Moody’s Manuals: Foreign and American Government 
Securities (various issues), Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932), United Nations (1948) and US Treasury Annual 
Financial Reports (various issues); For 1979-2010 restructurings Cruces and Trebesch (2013) 
https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/ 
 
Debt series; For the advanced economies interwar comparisons the time  series on total, external, and domestic 
central government debt government debt are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2011); the emerging market 
total external debt, 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), International Debt Statistics, Washington DC  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics.  
 
Central government revenues:1920-1939 from Mitchell (1998) and (2003); World Bank (2013), International 
Debt Statistics, Washington DC  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics provides  
1970-2011 emerging market data. 
 
Real GDP: Maddison http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ and Conference Board and Total Economy Database 
http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ 
 
Nominal GDP: Numerous country specific sources, as detailed in the Data Appendix. 
Nominal GDP, US dollars: 1980-2011 International Monetary Fund (2013), World Economic Outlook. 
Nominal Gross National Income (GNI), US dollars: 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), International Debt 
Statistics, Washington DC. 
 
Exports, US dollars (BoP): 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), International Debt Statistics, Washington 
DC . 
Debt servicing: For the interwar, 1920-1939:  League of Nations (various issues), and United Nations (1948); 
International Debt Statistics, Washington DC http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics 
provides the post 1970 emerging market data. 
 
Sovereign credit ratings: Fitch, Moody’s, Gaillard (2012) are used for the 1930s episodes while Institutional 
Investor http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3165784/Sovereign-Ratings-Track-Economy-Lower-in-
Country-Credit-Survey.html provides the post 1979 data. 
 
Source: The authors. See Data Appendix for additional details. 
 
III. The Episodes and Debt Relief 
In this section, we introduce the restructuring and default episodes that will be the centerpiece of 
our study; we sketch some of their more salient features. All episodes except the Unites States’ 1934 
abrogation of the gold clause involve external debt.  The debt in question is predominantly (but not 
exclusively) issued under foreign law, denominated in a foreign currency, and held by non-residents. In 
the cases we examine from the 1930s, we largely confine our attention to World War I debt. War debt is 
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somewhat of a misnomer, as for most borrowers (the exception is the United Kingdom) much of the debt 
included under this rubric was contracted after the war had ended and had the distinct character of 
reconstruction and stabilization loans.18 A distinguishing feature of this debt is that it is almost entirely 
contained within the official sectors - both the borrower and the lenders are sovereign governments. 
We focus, in particular, on official debts owed to the two largest creditor countries of the time, 
the United States and the United Kingdom (see Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932). The United Kingdom was 
a major creditor country to most European countries and owed debt only to the United States. The United 
States was a pure creditor and did not owe official debts to any other country. These two countries are 
therefore the two main creditor powers of the interwar period. 
For the emerging market episodes of 1978-2010 are different in this respect; the typical pattern 
involves private creditors and official borrowers. Often enough, however, the debts that end up 
restructured in these episodes under a sovereign umbrella started out as private debt, which the 
government stepped in to guarantee at a time of crisis.19   
The academic literature on sovereign default and restructuring has been primarily preoccupied 
with private creditors lending to public borrowers. The study of default on official debt is far more 
limited. The combination and comparison of these hybrid episodes is a novel feature of this paper.  
Before launching into a discussion of the war debts and their demise, the environment of the 
1930s has to be placed in historical context.  Bordo and Jonung (2001) who examine chronologically 
monetary and fiscal regimes from 1881 through 1995, provide an encompassing international setting and 
offer the following observations: (i) WWI not only gave rise to the high debt levels we examine here, but 
also saw governments become increasingly reliant on the inflation tax.20; (ii) the return of peace brought a 
18 See Bailey (1950), Lloyd (1934), US Treasury (1920) and (1933). 
19 See Diaz Alejandro (1985) for an early discussion of the contingent liabilities problem and Reinhart (2010) for 
documenting numerous historical examples. 
20 See also Bordo (2012) for a discussion of the inflation tax in a broad historical context. 
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desire for monetary stability but at the same gave rise to the policy dilemma we are interested in. They 
observe: 
“…in several of the belligerent countries a decision had to be made concerning the treatment of 
public debt, that is over the time path of budget surpluses to amortize outstanding debt. Governments had 
to choose whether to run contractionary fiscal policies, which would retire outstanding debt, or to default 
explicitly or implicitly via inflation. Any decision would have profound effects on the distribution of 
income between debtors and creditors.” 
Over the course of the interwar era (which Bordo and Jonung, 2001 apportion into three distinct 
regimes: the return to gold in the mid-1920s, the relatively short-lived gold standard, and the final 
collapse of gold), we will see the progression from earlier attempts to tighten fiscal conditions and pay 
down the war debt to both explicit default and implicit via reflation and the abandonment of the gold 
anchor. 
1. World War I debts 
  Table 1 lists 18 countries that, as of 1934, owed debt to the United States and the United 
Kingdom from World War I and its aftermath. Australia, New Zealand and Portugal only owed debt to 
the United Kingdom. Finland, which was the only country to fully honor its war debt obligations to the 
United States, drops out of the analysis.21 We add to this list of 18 default cases the United States 1934 
haircut (Table A1 in the appendix). This brings the total number of 1930s episodes to 19. In the various 
empirical exercises that follow, these countries are incorporated to the extent that the data permits. The 
core episodes with the most complete profile are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
United Kingdom, and United States.  
21 Finland was fully preoccupied dealing with Russians following its still recent independence and apparently 
wished to keep in best terms with the United States. 
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 The first column of Table 1 gives the amount of debt outstanding plus interest arrears at the time 
of the generalized default in June 1934. These amounts owed to the US and the UK vary somewhat across 
sources. For instance, the unpaid obligations that are recorded in the United Nations 1948 publication, 
Public Debt, 1914–1946, and in Baily (1950, p. 701)22 are not strictly the same as those shown in Table 1, 
which are taken from the annual financial reports by the US Treasury or in the Moody’s Manuals on 
Foreign Securities (although all numbers are quite close). Discrepancies may also arise from the exchange 
rate used to convert the debt into local currency, so as to allow one to construct a measure of the debt 
relief relative to GDP.  Our point estimates of debt relief (the last column) are based on the nominal GDP 
and exchange rates shown. When in doubt, we have opted for the more conservative estimates. 
 Table A1 in the appendix presents for the United States episode comparable calculations to those 
shown for the European countries. The debt outstanding as reported by the US Treasury is given for Nov 
15, 1934, while nominal GDP are calendar year figures.  The adoption of the Gold Reserve Act, which 
delinked US Treasury debt from gold (among other things) and devalued the dollar against gold, occurs 
on January 30-31, 1934. To address the lack of synchronicity, we provide the 1933 and 1934 figures to 







22 See http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1358.html. 
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Table 1. Unpaid Allied Wartime and Postwar Debt Owed to the United States and the United Kingdom: 
                                                  The 1934 Summer Defaults 
 
Sources: Debt amounts owed to the US are from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the 
Finances - For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1934, pp. 391. Debt figures are given for Nov 15, 1934. We add to this the 
amount of arrears, i.e. overdue payments under the debt restructuring agreements of the 1920s. Debt amounts owed to the 
UK are from the Moody's Manual of Investments and Securities Rating Service: Foreign and American Government 
Securities, 1935, p.1927. Debt figures are given for March 31, 1934, plus arrears. To compute present values (last column) 
we use the terms shown in the original loan documents, as shown in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). We follow their 
approach and use a 5% annual rate to discount future war debt payments. The amounts of debt outstanding under the broad 
category of WWI debt includes, especially for Eastern Europe, debts taken on after the war in connection with 
reconstruction. The breakdown is given for each debtor country in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014).  
Exchange rates are from Historical Statistics of the United States and United Nation (1948). The sources for nominal GDP 
for 1934 are as follows: US and UK from Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php; 
France, Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1815-1938 http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-
national-accounts; Italy, Francese and Pace (2008) 1861-2006; Belgium, 1835-2005, BNB, Center d'études économiques 
de la KUL; Greece, Kostelenos (2003), 1830-1939; Austria, 1924-1937. Global Financial Data; Finland GDP, Historical 
National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1860-2001, http://rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts; Portugal: 
Estadisticas Historicas Do Portugal, 1851-1952; New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, 1900-1947; Australia: GFD, Haig 
(2001) 1852-1948;  
Owed to US Owed to UK Total to US and UK
Debt outstanding Debt outstanding Debt outstanding Face value Present value
in US$ (w/ arrears) in US$ (w/ arrears) in US$ (w/ arrears) (upper bound) (lower bound)
United Kingdom 4,714,345,235 . 4,714,345,235 24.5 19.5
France 3,980,735,112 3,361,387,861 7,342,122,972 52.2 25.1
Italy 2,009,555,036 1,123,494,772 3,133,049,808 36.4 11.5
Belgium 413,430,000 64,631,010 478,061,010 4.1 2.7
Poland 226,248,308 17,107,860 243,356,167 . .
Czechoslovakia 165,409,455 0 165,409,455 . .
Yugoslavia 61,625,000 146,572,822 208,197,822 . .
Romania 63,883,007 140,836,167 204,719,173 . .
Greece 32,789,344 99,384,805 132,174,148 43.4 21.4
Austria 23,822,492 0 23,822,492 1.7 1.6
Estonia 18,079,383 1,432,045 19,511,429 . .
Finland (fully repaid) 8,711,996 0 8,711,996 0.2 0.2
Latvia 7,435,784 6,222,619 13,658,403 . .
Lithuania 6,650,080 0 6,650,080 . .
Hungary 2,086,096 0 2,086,096 . .
Australia 0 337,777,250 337,777,250 6.2 .
New Zealand 0 110,966,579 110,966,579 10.5 .
Portugal 0 99,459,373 99,459,373 10.3 .
Memorandum items:
Total owed the US: US GDP Owed/GDP (US)
11,734,806,327 66,800,000,000   17.6
Total owed the UK: UK GDP Owed/GDP (UK)
5,509,273,162 19,264,825,087   28.6
Debt relief to GDP (in %)
20 
 
Having introduced both the broader and core sample for the advanced economies defaults and 
provided some benchmarks for the magnitude of the defaults, we next take up the issue of the timing and 
sequencing of these credit events.    
The estimates of debt relief in Table 1 uses primarily 1934 GDP figures, as it uniformly dates the 
“de jure” default in that year. While the 1934 default date is appropriate for the United States case, this 
dating is less clear cut for the others. De facto, default and other irregularities on war debt payments 
began earlier. As the chronology presented in Table 2 makes plain, the intentionally temporary Hoover 
Moratorium is set in motion in 1931 (the moratorium also applies to Germany’s reparations payments).  
However, at the end of the moratorium in 1932, scheduled payments do not resume in uniform and 
regular fashion.  While the United Kingdom, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia make the scheduled December 15 payment on war debt, France, Belgium, 
Poland, Estonia and Hungary do not pay (see United States entry).23 For the latter group, the more 
relevant default date may be 1932 or 1933. Moreover, we know that most European countries suspended 
their war debt payments to the United Kingdom after the Lausanne war debt conference of 1932.  
However, no country except Finland, which fully repaid as scheduled, continued to service their war debt 







23 League of Nations, World Economic Survey (1932/1933), p. 332. 
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Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934 
 
International 
August 1924 Dawes Plan laid out German reparations of 1 billion marks a year, rising to 2.5 billion in 
five years. It was a restructuring of the terms laid out in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. 
June 1929 The Young Plan was designed to ease the terms of the reparation payments made by 
Germany, making a substantial share of the repayment state contingent. It is a second 
restructuring. 
June 20, 1931 Hoover Moratorium on payments of WWI and other war debts, including interest 
payments.  
July 9, 1932 Lausanne Conference: the European powers including the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, and Italy agree to suspend all war debt payments among themselves subject to a 
revision of their debts to the United States. The UK is by far the most important creditor 
country in Europe, and only owes debt to the United States. 





May 8, 1930 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
May 11, 1931 Kreditanstalt failure: Despite the Austrian government’s guaranty to cover the bank’s 
foreign debt, the bank failure quickly spread through Europe and international capital 
markets. 
October 9, 1931 Foreign exchange controls and depreciation. 
May 1933 Payments to the Bank of International Settlements, for the service of the League of Nations 




Standstill agreement of Austrian banks prolonged until January 1934.                                                                
                                                 Australia 
Suspension of Gold Standard 
July 1932 Suspension of war debt payments to the UK following the Lausanne Conference 
Belgium 
August 18, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
December 31, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
March 18, 1935 Foreign exchange controls reintroduced; devaluation of 28%. 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15. 
Czechoslovakia 
October 1931 Control on foreign exchanges 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15. 
Estonia 
October 28, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
October 1931 Control on foreign exchanges. 
Finland 
May 1, 1923 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 




Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934 (continued) 
 
France 
April 29, 1926 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
July 12, 1926 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
December 1932 Chamber rejected the government’s proposal to meet the War debt payment to the US 
scheduled for mid-December. 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt  installment  June 15 
                                                   Germany 
December 1922 Reparations Commission declares Germany in default culminating in the French 
occupation of the Ruhr. 
July 13, 1931 Following the Kreditanstalt crisis in Austria, foreign exchange controls are introduced; a 
variety of blocked Mark accounts are created through mid-1933. 
February 1932 Moratoria on external commercial debt payments. 
August 1932 Reparation payments under the Young Plan cancelled but other payments continued 
May 1933 Unilateral debt default and widespread capital controls 
July 1, 1934 General moratorium on transfers abroad. 
December 1, 1936 Death penalty for capital flight. 
Greece 
April 9, 1927 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
May 10, 1929 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
Sept. 28, 1931 Control on foreign exchanges; 49% currency depreciation 
April 1932 Moratoria on external public debt service. 
June 1934 Postpones for six months payment to US of interest on War debt due July 1st. 
Hungary 
April 25, 1924 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
September 1931 Control on foreign exchanges 
December 1931 Moratoria on external public debt service. 
January 1933 Standstill agreement renewed. 
Italy 
Nov. 14, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
January 12, 1926 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
September 1931 Re-introduction of some foreign exchange controls 
May 26, 1934  De facto suspension of convertibility; controls on exportation of bank notes 
July 22, 1935 Official conversion of convertibility. 
Latvia 
Sept. 24, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
October 1931 Control on foreign exchanges 
April 1932 Moratoria on external public debt service. 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 
Lithuania 
Sept. 29, 1924 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15                                         
                                               New Zealand 
December 1929            Currency parity with British Sterling is abandoned 
July 1932 Suspension of war debt payments to the UK following the Lausanne Conference 
January 20, 1933          Depreciation by 25% vis-à-vis British Sterling 
Poland 
November 14, 1924 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
July 1932 Control on foreign exchanges 
June 1934 
 
Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 
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Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934 (concluded) 
 
                                                Portugal 
June 3, 1924  Introduction of foreign exchange controls 
December 31, 1926 Agreement to restructure War debt with the United States 
January 1, 1932 Suspension of fixed exchange rate to the British Sterling 
                                                 Romania 
October 19, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
December 4, 1925 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
August 1933 Transfer moratorium declared. 
September 1933 Negotiation with bondholders to discuss debt service reduction. 
July 1934 Foreign debt agreement reached 
                                          United Kingdom 
June 19, 1923 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
Sept. 21, 1931 Abandonment of gold standard 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 
                                               United States 
June 20, 1931 Hoover Moratorium on payments of WWI and other War debts, including interest 
payments. Approved by Congress in December. 
November 1932 The US refuses postponement of war debt payments due December 15. France and the UK 
had made such a request. 
December 15,1932 UK, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
make the scheduled payment on War debt; France, Belgium, Poland, Estonia and Hungary 
do not pay. 
March 6, 1933 Roosevelt Proclamation resulting in embargo on gold and establishment of foreign 
exchange controls. Bank holiday. 
March 9, 1933 Suspension of gold convertibility 
April 5, 1933 Compulsory surrender of gold (more than $100) held by individuals. 
June 15, 1933 The governments of Britain, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania do not 
make full war debt payments to the United States and offer symbolic token payments 
instead. 
January 30, 1934 Gold Reserve Act: Abrogation of the gold clause 
January 31, 1934 Devaluation of 40.94%: from 1 troy ounce of gold =20.67 US dollars to 1 troy ounce of 
gold = 35.00US dollars. 
June 1934 Places embargo on export of silver. 
Yugoslavia 
May 3, 1926 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States 
August 9, 1927 Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom 
October 1931 Control on foreign exchanges 
March 1932 Moratoria on external commercial debt payments 
April 1932 Moratoria on external public debt service 
October 1932 Default on two loans 
June 1934 Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on war debt installment June 15 
 
2. Middle-high income emerging market episodes: 1980s debt crisis to the present 
  The emerging market default and restructuring episodes covered in this study are a subset of the 
larger universe of debt crises in developing countries. Specifically, we limit our coverage to episodes in 
middle-to-high-income emerging markets. It is our contention that the emerging markets of today have 
much in common with the advanced economies of the 1930s. Unfortunately, in recent years the same can 
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be said about the advanced economies of today. Most middle-to-high- income emerging markets have 
access (albeit with much volatility and frequent sudden stops) to international capital markets and attract 
private capital flows in a manner more closely resembling pre-World War II advanced economies than the 
low-income countries that rely more heavily on concessional lending and aid. 
In earlier work Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) examined the incidence of default. In this paper we 
also aim to quantify the magnitude of the debt relief achieved in the numerous defaults and restructurings 
in emerging markets since the late 1970s. Our starting point is the comprehensive database on haircuts 
recently compiled by Cruces and Trebesch (2013). They provide detailed information on each individual 
restructuring over 1979-2010 for all emerging and developing countries that have the prerequisite data.  
We aggregate these individual restructurings into a default spell to the extent that they are sequentially 
connected. Our dating of default spells is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Table 3 lists the 35 episodes that make up the emerging market sample and column (1) provides 
the dates of the default spell (or spells, as some countries like Ecuador and Argentina have more than one 
default or restructuring episode since the late 1970s. The cumulative haircuts shown in column (4) are 
from Cruces and Trebesch (2013); the final column calculates the debt relief as a percent of GDP in their 
baseline computation. A companion Appendix Table B1 presents additional detail on the individual 
building blocks of the cumulative default measure shown here. As was the case with the advanced 
economies interwar sample, not all episodes can be documented to the same extent. Some of the transition 
economies have data that only partially covers their default or restructuring episodes, while some of the 
smaller island nations are excluded from databases, (Institutional Investor Ratings, Total Economy 
database, etc.)  
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Table 3. Middle-High Income Emerging Market Episodes of Default or Debt Restructuring, 1978-2010 
 
Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Table 1, Appendix Table B1, sources cited 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) Baseline
1 Algeria 1991-1996 4,657 9.9           0.054 0.5           
2 Argentina 1982-1993 67,891 28.7         0.477 24.0         
3 Argentina 2001-2005 60,572 33.4         0.425 14.2         
4 Bosnia and H. 1992-1997 1,300 24.6         0.896 22.1         
5 Brazil 1983-1994 130,493 23.9         0.375 14.3         
6 Bulgaria 1990-1994 7,910 98.7         0.563 55.6         
7 Chile 1983-1990 21,731 64.8         0.379 35.6         
8 Costa Rica 1983-1990 2,433 42.6         0.791 43.4         
9 Croatia 1992-1996 858 3.7           0.11 0.4           
10 Dominican Rep. 1982-1994 1,910 13.6         0.731 13.3         
11 Dominican Rep. 2005 1,280 3.8           0.016 0.1           
12 Dominica 2003-2005 144 39.9         0.54 21.6         
13 Ecuador 1982-1995 12,714 54.3         0.512 31.2         
14 Ecuador 1999-2000 6,700 35.9 0.334 12.0         
15 Ecuador 2008-2009 3,190 5.5 0.528 2.9           
16 Gabon 1986-1994 226 5.3           0.054 0.3           
17 Grenada 2004-2005 210 30.2 0.339 10.2         
18 Jamaica 1978-1993 1,452 31.1         0.516 24.4
19 Jordan 1989-1993 1,289 23.3         0.227 5.3
20 Macedonia, FYR 1992-1997 229 6.1           0.346 2.1
21 Mexico 1982-1990 177,771 61.8         0.42 36.2
22 Panama 1983-1996 4,967 53.3         0.389 22.9
23 Peru 1980-1997 11,320 19.1         0.64 13.8
24 Poland 1981-1994 30,912 29.8         n.a. 15.1
25 Romania 1981-1986 2,965 6.2           0.158 0.9
26 Russia 1991-2000 68,683 26.4         0.495 11.3
27 Serbia & Montenegro 2003-2004 2,700 11.5 0.709 8.1
28 Seychelles 2008-2010 320 32.9 0.562 18.5
29 Slovenia 1992-1996 812 3.9 0.033 0.1
30 South Africa 1985-1993 23,400 17.9         0.377 9.2
31 Trinidad & Tobago 1988-1989 446 10.3 0.155 1.6
32 Turkey 1978-1982 5,067 5.8           0.316 0.9
33 Uruguay 1983-1991 5,913 47.8         0.46 34.3
34 Uruguay 2003 3,127 26.0         0.079 2.1
35 Venezuela 1983-1990 60,230 124.5      0.387 41.6
Averages  20,738       30.2       0.39       15.7 
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3. Debt relief estimates 
Subject to the limitations discussed in the preceding section, Figure 1a presents our preferred 
estimate of the magnitude of debt relief as a share of GDP.  The figure shows in ascending order a total 46 
individual advanced and emerging market default/restructuring episodes. The corresponding estimate is 
shown alongside the country and episode date. The red and green bars denote the advanced and emerging 
market economies, respectively. 
Nine of the 18 countries defaulting on war debt to the US and the UK in the 1930s (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and United Kingdom) listed in Table 1 
are shown in Figure 1a.  The remaining 10 default cases are excluded owing to data limitations, mainly 
because no nominal GDP data is available, although we do have the nominal amounts owed and defaulted 
upon in June 1934 (see Table 1).24  The haircut associated with the abrogation of the gold clause in the 
United States in conjunction with the 41 percent devaluation of the dollar in early 1934 (Table A1) is also 
included in Figure 1a. The average debt relief/GDP for this group of 10 is 20.6 percent.  
Figure 1b gives more detailed estimates on the war debt relief of 1934 for main creditor countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom) vis-à-vis the UK and the US. 
We compare the debt relief in face value terms (nominal write-off) to our debt relief estimates in present 
value terms, using the interest rate and repayment terms from the original debt agreements of each case 
and an annual 5% discount rate.25 The war debt restructuring agreement often implied very long maturity 
extensions, with new maturities reaching as far as the 1980s. For this reason, the present value debt relief 
estimates are often considerably below the face value estimates, especially for agreements with the United 
Kingdom. At the same time, the large majority of war loans would have already fallen due by 1934, had 
this debt not been rescheduled under very generous terms. The present value relief estimates for 1934 are 
therefore artificially small and should be interpreted as the lower bound, while the face value debt 
24 See also New York Times, June 15, 1934. 
25 The choice of a 5% discount rate follows the literature of the time, see for instance, Molton and Pasvolsky (1932). 
27 
 
                                                     
reduction is more appropriate assessment on the scope of debt relief in 1934. We are currently working on 
computing haircuts for the 1920s agreement so that we can eventually compute cumulative haircuts that 
are fully comparable to the C&T (2013) numbers.  
The 35 middle-high income emerging market episodes listed in Table 3 yield an average debt 
relief estimate of 15.7 percent, about four percentage points lower than on the advanced economy war 
debt. The range of variation across the emerging markets is much higher than for the 1930 episodes, 
ranging from a high of around 56 percent for Bulgaria to nil. 26 Seven debt restructuring episodes where 
debt relief amounted to less than one percent of GDP are not shown in Figure 1a but are included in the 
average cited above and reported in Table 3.  The episodes are Algeria 1991-1996, Croatia 1992-1996, 
Dominican Republic 2005, Gabon 1986-1994, Romania 1981-1986, Slovenia 1992-1996, Turkey 1978-
1982. 
While our emphasis in this paper is confined to the middle-to high income emerging market 
restructuring episodes listed in Table 3, we also calculate comparable debt relief estimates for lower 
income emerging markets included in the Cruces and Trebesch (2013) study. On the whole, debt relief 
estimates for the poorer countries run lower despite higher haircuts. The share of affected debt is smaller 
both in absolute dollar amounts and relative to domestic GDP, as private lending is limited and official 
sources and aid play a more prominent role. 
The main conclusions drawn from this exercise in that restructurings averaging 16-21 percent of 
GDP were not trivial in helping governments resolve past debt overhangs and that, in effect, (for the 
reasons discussed in Section II) these figures may underestimate the true magnitude of debt relief.  Most 
importantly, the generalized default on war debt was not limited to debt owed the United States and the 
United Kingdom (which are the only ones we systematically quantify here). Large amounts of 
26 In the case of Bulgaria, the haircut is about 56 percent (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013) and the share of affected debt 
to GDP is almost 100 percent (columns 3 and 4, Table 3). 
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governmental debt were also owed to France, Italy and Belgium, including the notorious reparation debts 
by Germany.27  
Furthermore, the orders of magnitude of the advanced economy debt write-downs relative to the 
size of the economy are not dissimilar from the magnitudes seen in the modern vintage EM defaults and 
restructurings. Of course, our analysis only offers a first pass at quantifying and comparing seemingly 
disparate credit events. Ongoing work makes further refinements in these comparisons introducing a 
variety of control groups, which allow for clearer distinctions between episodes that primarily involve 
official debt versus episodes that are defaults on private creditors, as well as “decisive” versus 
“intermediate” credit events. Our emphasis here on debt reduction via restructuring and default is not 
meant to suggest that other forms of debt reduction were not quantitatively important as well. Fiscal 
retrenchment, structural reform, financial repression, and (in the case of domestic currency denominated 
debt) inflation often co-existed in these episodes of debt write-offs. 
Taking together Table 1 and Table A1 in the Appendix, it is also evident that the magnitude of 
the US haircut from devaluations and the abrogation of the gold clause relative to GDP is about 16-17 
percent, a comparable order of magnitude to the amount it cost the US to forgive European debts. In the 






27 Belgium, France and Italy were each owed total war debts of more than 1bn 1933 US Dollars, respectively, see 
Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). 
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Figure 1a. Default, Restructuring, and Debt Relief: World War I Debt to the US and the UK, 1934, 
Emerging Markets, 1978-2010, United States, 1934 (Debt relief as a percent of GDP) 
  
 
Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Table 1a, Appendix Table B1, sources cited 
therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
Notes: Estimates of debt relief correspond to “Method 2”. We use the face value estimates for the 1934 events. 
Seven debt restructuring episodes where debt relief amounted to less than one percent of GDP are not shown in 
Figure 1 but are included in the reported average. The episodes are Algeria 1991-1996, Croatia 1992-1996, 
Dominican Republic 2005, Gabon 1986-1994, Romania 1981-1986, Slovenia 1992-1996, Turkey 1978-1982. 
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 Figure 1b. War Debt Relief of Major European Countries as Share of GDP in 1934  
 
 
Notes: Estimates of war debt relief in % of creditor country GDP. Figures are shown for debt owed to the US and to 
the UK separately. The sources are the same as in Table 1a. The present value estimates use an annual discount rate 
of 5% and the contractual debt service streams of the original agreements as in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932).  
 
IV. Default and Restructuring Comparisons: Before and After, North and South 
This section takes the “north-south” comparison of the sovereign default and restructuring 
experience further by examining the evolution of income levels and growth, credit ratings and market 
access, debt servicing burdens, and the level and composition of debt around this hybrid cross-country 
experience of sovereign default and restructuring. 
1. Income levels and growth 
Our starting point is to examine the performance of per capita GDP (levels and growth rates) 
episode by episode in and around the date of restructuring that anchors the exercise, denoted in all figures 
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and tables by T. Our dating of “T” with its limitations was discussed in Section II. Here we define the 
window (years before and after T) used in our analysis. The emphasis is primarily on what happens at the 
time (T) and in the aftermath of debt relief, here defined as the “final” or decisive restructuring.  
For a few emerging markets, the final restructuring may have been the only one in a short-lived 
credit event that  lasted  two years or less, as was the case for Uruguay in 2003. More often than not, 
however, the final exit from default status came after a multi-year stint. The longest cumulative default 
spells were for Peru and Jamaica and lasted 18 and 16 years, respectively. In a significant number of 
cases, there were several restructurings before “the restructuring to end all restructurings” materialized 
(see Appendix Table B1).  As Cruces and Trebesch (2013) document, Poland had a total of seven 
restructurings before their “final” one in 1994; Jamaica had six before reaching closure on that particular 
16-year episode; Brazil had a total of six tries, and so on. The average duration of the full default spells 
for the 35 EM episodes shown in Table 3 is 7.3 years. 
Also the default and payment irregularities on World War I debt in the advanced economies were 
a protracted process, spanning roughly from the debt settlements (which restructured the profile of the 
debt) of the early 1920s until the generalized default of mid-1934. The same is true for the debt overhang 
on non-World War I public and private debts, which stretching into the post-World War II era. For 
example, Austria and Germany were in default through 1952; Italy was in default 1940-1945; Greece and 
Hungary had even longer stints in default status through 1964 and 1967, respectively. 28 In addition, there 
was the notorious issue with the German Reparation Debt which originated in the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919, is declared in default for the first time in 1922 (Table 2), is restructured under the Dawes Plan in 
1924, restructured again under the Young Plan in 1929, and ultimately defaulted on during 1932-1934.   
We focus on a four-year window around T; the first leg, T-4 to T can provide a sense of the run-
up of credit events that bring some closure and debt relief.  However, this four-year window does not 
28 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
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allow us to say much (except for the very short default episodes) about the antecedents of a “new” default 
or restructuring episode. Thus, our analysis and results are not to be comingled and confused with the 
literature on early warnings of debt crises (see Reinhart, 2002, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig, 
2003 and Manasse and Roubini, 2009), which attempt to characterize the run-up to the first wave of 
distress.29 Our interest in this paper is aligned more closely with Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), who 
study what factors determine access to international capital markets for a large sample of emerging 
markets, examine international capital flows following a default, an issue we take up later in this 
section. 30 
Figure 2 plots average real per capita GDP level (normalized to equal one at time T) around final 
restructurings (exit from default).31 The average covers 33 of the 35 middle-high income emerging 
markets (Table 3) for which we have real per capita GDP data.32 The red line shows the comparable 
average for12 of the 16 defaulters the 1930s shown in Table 1a plus the United States and Germany. 
While the lines show the level of per capita GDP, from both the normalization to T=1 and the inset box, 
Figure 2, also summarizes the growth performance.  
For the 1930s average, 1932 marks the trough in per capita GDP with barely any change through 
1934. After 1934 there is a sharp rebound (cumulative growth is 16% from T to T+4) following a 
prolonged collapse of 7 percent. Rebound notwithstanding, it takes six years to recoup the income level 
recorded in T-4 (as we will show, it takes even longer to surpass the prior economic peak in per capita 
GDP, which usually predated T-4 and corresponds to 1930). The emerging market countries show a flat 
per capita GDP path while in the default spell (through T) but a substantial pick up thereafter.  
29 In Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also, T is set as the first year of a default spell and hence asks a different question. 
30 Gelos et al. (2011), however, date the beginning of the default spell not its conclusion. 
31 See Tomz and Wright (2007) for a long-run study on the link between sovereign default and output. 





                                                     
Figure 2. Real Per Capita GDP Around Final Restructurings (Exit from Default) in Middle-High Income 
Emerging Markets, 1978-2010 and Selected 1934 Sovereign Default Episodes (Mostly on World War I 
Debt to United States) 
8-year window around credit event, level of real per capita GDP at T=1 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, Maddison Database, Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009 and 2013) Total Economy 
Database and authors’ calculations. War debt defaults on debts to the US.  
In sum, while the magnitude of recovery in per capita GDP over the four years following a 
decisive restructuring or default ranges from a cumulative average increase of 9 to 16 percent for the two 
groups of emerging and advanced economies, the more salient feature of the exercise is finding that there 
is broad evidence of a marked pick-up in economic activity following debt write-off/debt relief episodes. 
Of the 47 combined advanced and emerging market episodes, 39 had positive growth over T to T+4. Of 
the remaining eight, six had a flat real per capita GDP profile (defined as less than or equal to a one 
percent change in either direction) and two out of 47 had negative cumulative growth. 
Real per capita GDP growth around final
 restructurings
or defaults T-4 to T T to T+4
EMs, 1978-2010 3.2             9.2             








T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4
33 episodes in middle-high income 
emerging markets, 1978-2010 
(T=final year of restructuring)
14 interwar episodes, 12 WWI debt default 




It is beyond the scope of this paper to apportion to what extent the post-debt relief recovery owed 
to the restructuring per se and what role may have been played by other factors. In the case of the 1930s 
episodes, Eichengreen (1992) stressed the importance of stimulus provided by exits from the gold 
standard.33 However, these exits from the golden fetters were spread over a five-year period, from the 
early British and Greek exits in 1931 (Table 2) to the French exit five years later in 1936. The defaults 
and debt write-downs were clustered much more closely in the trough 1932-1934. On the fiscal front, of 
course public works programs were also initiated in the T to T+4 span during the depression, but as with 
monetary policy there was considerable dispersion in their timing and magnitudes. For emerging markets, 
the usually sharp depreciations that accompany debt crises (see Reinhart, 2002) may have been a force 
behind these recoveries. 
 
  2. Capital market access and sovereign credit ratings   
We next examine the evolution of credit ratings around the episodes of interest. In several 
influential models of sovereign default, the reputational damage done by a default lasts forever and access 
to international capital markets is irrevocably lost.34 In reality, we know that governments who have 
behaved badly (defaulted on their obligations) ultimately regain their ability to borrow again and, in 
scores of cases, default again and again. An interesting question is what can be learned about market 
access from the behavior of sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of a default or restructuring. We 
discuss the 1930s sample and the modern emerging market episodes in turn. 
 In the midst of an environment characterized by profound economic contraction, systemic global 
banking crisis, trade wars, record unemployment, and a rising incidence of private and sovereign defaults 
it is hardly surprising that sovereign credit ratings drifted steadily lower through most of the 1930s in 
Europe and elsewhere.  Linking the contribution to this generalized downward trend to the default on war 
debt of one government on another government is a far more complicated question. Table 4 presents the 
33 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). 
34 See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). 
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sovereign ratings for most of the countries that appear in Table 1. It would be difficult to deduce from the 
evolution of ratings the fact that France and the UK defaulted on war debt in amounts that exceeded 20 
percent of their GDP in 1934. France and Britain retained their AAA status in the Fitch ratings; Moodys’ 
notched the UK down to Aa (from Aaa) and France remained at Aa.  Also puzzling is how Greece and 
Germany managed to retain a B rating from Moodys when both had defaulted on all debts in all creditors. 
The Moody’s description of a C rating (Appendix Table B2) read “Obligations rated C are the lowest 
rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery.” Perhaps there was optimism in their 
recovery of principal or interest. 
Table 4. Interwar Defaults and Sovereign Credit Ratings: Moody’s and Fitch, 1930-1939 
 
Sources: Fitch (2013), Gaillard (2012), and Moody’s (2013). Italics denote year of the war debt default. 
 
Country Default year(s) 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Austria 1932, 1934-1952  Aa  Aa A Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba Ba B
Belgium 1934 Aa Aa Aa Aa A A A A A A
Bulgaria 1932, 1934 -1992  Baa  Baa Ba B B B B B B B
Czechoslovakia 1934, 1938-1946 A A Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa 
Estonia 1934 Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa
Finland none A A Baa Baa Baa A A A A A
France 1934 Aa Aa Aa Aa Aa Aa Aa A A A
Germany 1932, 1939-1952 Aa Aa Baa Baa Baa B B B B B
Greece 1932, 1934 -1964  Baa  Baa  Baa B B B B B B B
Hungary 1932, 1934 -1937, 1940-1967 A A Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba
Italy 1934,  1940-1946 A A  Baa  Baa A A A Baa Baa Baa
Lithuania 1934 Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba
Poland 1934, 1936, 1940-1952 Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba
Romania 1934 B Ba Ba Ba B B B B B B
United Kingdom 1934 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa Aa Aa Aa Aa Aa
Yugoslavia 1933, 1934- 1950 Ba Ba Ba B B B B Ba Ba Ba
Austria 1932, 1934 -1952 AA AA A BBB BBB B B B
Belgium 1934 AA AA A A A A A A A A
Bulgaria 1932, 1934- 1992 BBB BB CCC CCC CC CC CC C C C
Czechoslovakia 1934 , 1938-1946 A A BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
Estonia 1934 BBB BB B B B B B B BB BB
Finland none A BBB BB BB BBB A A AA A A
France 1934 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA A A A
Germany 1932, 1939-1952 AAA A BB BB BB CCC
Greece 1932, 1934- 1964 BBB BBB CCC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
Hungary 1932, 1934- 1937, 1940-1967 A A CCC CCC CC CC CC
Italy 1934 , 1940-1946 A BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB B B
Poland 1934, 1936, 1940-1952 BBB BBB BB BB BB BB BB
United Kingdom 1934 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA
Yugoslavia 1933, 1934 -1950 BB BB B CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
US Dollar Ratings Assigned by Moody's
US Dollar Ratings Assigned by Fitch
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Beyond the ratings themselves, the usual important question on capital market access after a 
default is somewhat moot in the context of the war debt defaults of 1934 or, more generally the 
Depression. As Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) observe:35  
“All evidence points to the latter part of the interwar period, the period of the Great Depression, as the 
era of weakest financial integration: capital flows were small, countries behaved like closed economies in 
the capital market, and real and nominal price (interest rate) differentials expanded.” 
 Turning to emerging markets, the Institutional Investor ratings (IIR), which are compiled twice a 
year, are based on information provided by economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks 
and securities firms.  The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 given 
to those countries perceived as having the lowest chance of defaulting on their government debt 
obligations.36  Hence a transformed variable, (100 - IIR) can be interpreted as a proxy for default risk.  
The first ratings were published in 1979, and hence provide coverage for the entire sample of emerging 
market restructurings and defaults (although some of the smaller countries were added to the IIR sample 
at a later date). In the most recent credit survey (March 2013) the average credit rating for 179 sovereign 
fell 0.6 point to 43.9; the US credit rating fell 1.1 point to 88.8 its lowest level in the 33-year history of 
the survey. 
 In Figure 3, the September rating year T is normalized to 1 and the average (solid line) and 
plus/minus one standard deviation bounds (dashed line) are plotted for 30 of the 35 episodes for which 
there is full data.37 The average increases in the IIR index are 22 percent after two years and 38 percent 
after four years.  The box inset to Figure 3 gives the number and share of countries for different ranges of 
increases. For example, for 7 of the episodes (23 percent), the cumulative increase in the IIR from T to 
35 See also Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for a long view on international capital mobility, which encompasses both of 
the sample periods covered in this paper. 
36 For details of the survey see http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/4142/Overview.html. Although not 
critical to our analysis below, we interpret the ratings reported in each semiannual survey as capturing the near-term 
risk of default within one to two years. 
37 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Dominica, Macedonia are not rated at all in the period surrounding the final 
restructuring while the coverage for Seychelles is incomplete. 
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T+4 is in excess of 60 percent. This solid pattern of recovery is broadly consistent with the findings in  
Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), who define market access, “as public or publicly guaranteed bond 
issuances or public or publicly guaranteed borrowing through a private syndicated bank loan that results 
in an increase in the country’s indebtedness.” On the question of how long it takes countries to regain 
market after an exit from defaults, they suggest that the median number of years it took countries to tap 
the markets after default fell from four years in the 1980’s to zero in the 1990’s. Thus, re-entry seems to 
typically occur within the four-year window explored here. The single lowest reading at T+4 was 0.89 for 
Ecuador in the aftermath of the 1982 -1995 episode (there are 3 of the 30 cases, including Ecuador where 
the rating was below what is was at the time of the restructuring). But this outcome was not because 
Ecuador remained shut out of capital markets since its “final” Brady Plan restructuring but rather because 
it was quick to re-leverage after the Brady restructuring and faced a new debt crisis in 1999-2000.38 
 
The panorama presented by the Institutional Investor Ratings is consistent with the return of international 
capital at the time of the final restructuring or in the four years following the final deal. In effect, 
sometimes the return of international capital flows returns in a volume that was sufficiently large (relative 
to the countries historical norm) that it would be considered a “capital inflow bonanza”, as in Reinhart 
and Reinhart (2009). The dates of the bonanza episodes reported in that paper are available for 31 of the 
35 episodes in this study; we found that 9 of 31 countries (29 percent) experienced bonanzas over T to 




38 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) on this phenomenon and the subsection entitled Did default or 




                                                     
Figure 3. Institutional Investor Ratings in the Aftermath of “Final” Restructuring, Middle-High Income 
Emerging Market Episodes, 1979-2010 
 
Sources: Institutional Investor, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: IIR Ratings are bounded by 0 (least creditworthy) to a perfect score of 100. The ratings are produced twice a 
year in March and September.  We normalize by the September rating in the year of the final restructuring (i.e. the 
exit from a restructuring or default spell, that may involve more than one restructuring, see Cruces and Trebesch, 
2013). 
  
3. Servicing the debt  
 Another dimension to consider in evaluating the aftermath of debt relief or write-downs is its 
impact on debt servicing burdens. To this end, we have compiled League of Nations data for the interwar 
years on central government total debt service (interest payments plus amortizations for both domestic 
and foreign public debt) for the advanced economies appearing in Table 1a, as well as for Germany and 
the United States. Figure 4 presents the ratios of total debt service to both GDP (the dashed line plotted 
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against the right axis) and total central government revenue (solid line, left axis). 39 Between 1920 and 
1931, both series display considerable volatility and no apparent trend. Beginning in 1931, which marks 
the start of the Hoover Moratorium on war debt, until 1938 the series become less volatile and persistently 
trend lower. France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom post the most significant declines in debt 
servicing. While Figure 4 does not show the breakdown of total costs into interest payments and 
amortization, our appraisal of the underlying data clearly places the lion’s share of the decline on 
significant reductions in amortization. The debt servicing data may indeed be more revealing in these 
1930s episodes than the outstanding debt stocks (which we examine next). The reason for this, is that 
while some countries (Austria, for instance) immediately write the war debt off their books in 1934.  
France having discontinued servicing war debt in 1932 removes it from its books six years later in 1938. 
Others, like Belgium and the United Kingdom keep World War I debt in their official debt figures until 
the end of World War II.  
39 Long time series for central government revenues are taken from Mitchell (1998 and 2003), which in most cases 
start in the 19th century (if not earlier). 
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Figure 4. Interwar Public Debt Service, 1920-1939:  
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom and United States  
(as a percent of central government revenue and as a percent of GDP) 
 
Sources: League of Nations, Public Finances of Foreign Countries (1936), Mitchell (1998 and 2003), United 
Nations (1948) based on the Yearbooks, nominal GDP cited in the Data Appendix, and authors’ calculations. 
 Unlike the common (nearly so) default event in 1932-1934, the default spells, emerging market 
default restructuring episodes are dispersed throughout 1978-2010. In Figure 5, we plot for the 1970-2011 
The average debt service on total external debt (public plus private external debt), which was at the center 
of the debt crises, especially in the 1980s. The chart shows debt servicing relative to gross national 
income (GNI) a measure commonly used by the World Bank in their analytical work of debt and relative 
to exports. The debt service/GNI measure is not plotted but summarized in the box inset, which break the 
debt service into three sub-periods: three years before the initial year of default, the entire default spell 
and three years follow T, the final restructuring or exit from default. The picture that emerges from both 
series (more pronounced in debt service-to-exports ratio, which drops from 37 percent to 19 percent) is 
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declining even before the “final restructuring” as in numerous cases (as discussed) there are multiple 
restructuring efforts in between the start and end of the default spell. Also, there are periods of debt 
standstills as well. However, this aggregate downward drift in debt servicing in emerging markets also 
importantly owes to external factors. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5 (solid line, right scale), after an 
abrupt spike in 1979 through mid-1982, there is a sustained and marked decline in real international 
interest rates through 2011 importantly driven by developments in US monetary policy. Even in the 
absence of haircuts, this beneficial trend would account for the observed reduction in debt servicing. 
Figure 5. External Debt Servicing, Default and Restructuring, and US Interest Rates:  
Middle-High Income Emerging Markets, 1970-2011 
Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for the episodes, International Debt Statistics, 
World Bank for the debt servicing ratios and International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
Notes: The debt service ratios are the standard ones reported by the World Bank where GNI stands for gross 
national income. Six of the countries that are part of the sample as shown in Table 3, do not have sufficient data to 
compute the before-during-after restructuring comparisons. The missing countries are: Croatia, Grenada, Poland, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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4. Did default or restructuring reduce the debt? 
 Governments usually get to the stage of debt restructuring and or default during hard times when 
other policies and measures have been tried and proved inadequate, insufficient, unsustainable, or a 
combination of these. A successful debt reduction package that marks an exit from a default regime apart 
from reducing the burden of debt servicing, restoring capital market access and stimulating growth would 
be expected to also to deliver some form of reduction in debt ratios that define whether the path is a 
sustainable one or not. In many of the episodes studied here part of the “success” also involved changing 
the composition of the debt. A common form of restructuring involves exchanges of short-term debt for 
longer maturities or exchanges of marketable debt for nonmarketable instruments that pose lower rollover 
risks. Analyzing to what extent these compositional change materialize is beyond the scope of this paper.  
A compositional shift that was highly sought after in both the 1930s episodes and the modern 
EMs is to shift exposure away from external debt. To that end, for the US and European episodes of the 
1930s we use the long time series on total, domestic, external central government debt assembled in 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2011).40 For the emerging markets, we study the evolution of total 
external debt, which aggregates public, publicly guaranteed, and private debts. As many a crisis episode 
has shown, private debts before the crises often morph into public debt after the crisis. 41  
Table 5 documents changes in the stock of total, external and domestic debt for the period 1930 to 
1934 and 1934 to 1937. We also calculate (not included in the table) the debt change over the entire 1930-
1937 period. The cumulative reductions in debt as percent of GDP for France, Greece, and Italy are 50, 
36, 30 percentage points, respectively. Sharp declines in external debt (where war debt figured 
prominently) primarily account for this fast deleveraging. 
40 If general government debt is used in the analysis it is so noted. 
41 See Diaz-Alejandro (1985) for an early discussion of the contingent liabilities problem and Reinhart (2010) for 
documenting numerous historical examples.. 
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Table 5. Did the Defaults Reduce the Debt? 1920-1939 
 
Debt/ GDP Peak
ratio 1930 to 1934 1934 to 1937 Year
Central government debt 19.9 -3.6 1935 Since 1934, the 1923 Reconstruction
External 11.2 3.0 1937 Loan is excluded from official
Domestic 8.7 -6.6 1934 figures.
Central government debt 14.7 -7.7 1922 The December 1945 statement omits for
External -2.2 -4.5 1926 the first time World War I debt. 1
Domestic 17.0 -3.2 1922  
Central government debt 9.2 -59.0 1921 From 1932 to 1937, no foreign debt 
External 6.4 -64.2 1925 numbers were published. Reported 
Domestic 48.2 -25.2 1921 here are 1927-1931 and 1931-1938.  2
Central government debt 11.9 7.0 1922 Recorded debt numbers significantly
External -3.1 -1.1 1931 underestimate public indebtedness, as 
Domestic 15.0 8.1 1937 off balance sheet funding balloons.3
Central government debt -22.7 -13.7 1931 Total debt reaches 139% in 1931, while 
External -18.5 -10.4 1931 external debt exceeds 100%--by far the
Domestic -4.2 -3.3 1922 highest external dependence in this group.
General government debt -7.9 -21.7 1920 External debt peaks at 85%
External -44.2 -0.4 1920 the historic high (1861 onwards). 
Domestic 36.3 -21.4 1934 Amortizations are significant. 4
Central government debt 10.6 15.3 1937 UK WWI loans to Allies are also
External -0.2 -3.6 1923  being defaulted on. Since 1931 Australia
Domestic 10.8 18.9 1937 excludes interest on War debt. 1
Central government debt 23.2 -1.4 1939 All debt is domestic. The 1939 peak
External 0.0 0.0 n.a. is 43.9%, lower than all
Domestic 23.2 -1.4 1939 others in this except Austria (which 
writes off WWI debts in 1934.
1 United Nations (1948) page 24.
2 From 1938 WWI debts are excluded from the official data, United Nations (1948).
3 See discussion in Ritschl (2012).
4 Francese and Pace (2008).














France in 1936 and Italy in 1935 (along with the Netherlands and Switzerland) exited 
comparatively late from the gold standard; Italy and France had very limited scope to finance a fiscal 
expansion through much of the Depression. Relative to the early exits from gold for Germany and the 
United Kingdom in 1931, debt buildups in the 19 to 26 percent of GDP were recorded in 1930-1937 for 
the UK, US and Germany.  In five of the seven countries, total debt/GDP fell following the 1934 default  
For the US the decline is marginal.  France and Italy recorded the largest reductions, 59 and 22 
percent, respectively.  Germany and the United Kingdom recorded increases in total debt that were driven 
by increases in domestic debt.   
Table 6, presents a summary of external debt/exports for emerging market episodes. In the nine- 
year window we examine around the final restructuring episode, debt to exports falls, on average, by 74 
percent. The larger decline occurs in T-4 to T. While this may appear counterintuitive, it is important to 
remember that by the time that last restructuring is agreed upon, there had often been one or more prior 
debt reduction efforts. Also, exits from default (T to T+4) are often accompanied or followed by new 
bouts of borrowing, as capital market re-entry (as evidenced by the sharp improvement in sovereign 




Table 6. Did the Defaults Reduce the Debt? Emerging Markets, 1979-2010 
 
 
In Figure 6 we compare the advanced economy and emerging market experience over T-4 to T+4. 
For the emerging markets, we scale total external debt by gross national income (GNI). For the advanced 
economies, we plot external (foreign) central government debt/GDP. T=1934 for the interwar default 
episodes while T=last year (or exit) from restructuring/default spell for the emerging market entries. 
Country T = Final
 restructuring T-4 to T T to T+4 T-4 to T+4 year level
Algeria 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1988 319.8
Argentina 1993 -201.6 41.3 -160.3 1987 698.6
Argentina 2005 -160.9 -67.9 -228.8 . .
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2009 178.6
Brazil 1994 -32.6 81.5 48.9 1984 436.3
Bulgaria 1994 32.2 -4.9 27.4 1995 280.1
Chile 1990 -208.5 -32.2 -240.6 1985 435.6
Costa Rica 1990 -142.0 -68.9 -210.9 1982 366.8
Dominica 2005 18.4 -38.2 -19.8 2003 254.8
Dominican Republic 1994 -149.9 -22.8 -172.6 1985 265.7
Dominican Republic 2005 8.4 35.8 44.2 . .
Ecuador 1995 -101.3 33.6 -67.6 1989 427.3
Ecuador 2000 -36.0 -67.5 -103.5 . .
Gabon 1994 15.8 42.1 57.9 1994 202.7
Grenada 2005 133.8 59.2 193.0 2004 330.5
Jamaica 1993 -54.7 9.0 -45.7 1985 334.1
Jordan 1993 -44.5 67.3 22.8 1991 373.8
Macedonia, FYR 1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2010 178.8
Mexico 1990 -155.9 -14.9 -170.7 1986 356.7
Panama 1996 -15.2 1.6 -13.6 1989 133.5
Peru 1997 -207.7 -23.2 -230.8 1988 534.2
Romania 1986 -13.9 -48.7 -62.6 2010 254.7
Russian Federation 2000 5.0 -23.5 -18.5 1999 203.4
Seychelles 2010 21.2 n.a. n.a. 2009 164.8
South Africa 1993 0.0 -7.6 -7.6 2010 98.1
Turkey 1982 -277.9 52.9 -225.0 2001 536.5
Uruguay 1991 -81.7 -36.6 -118.3 2003 334.4
Uruguay 2003 148.4 -180.7 -32.3 . .
Venezuela 1990 -150.7 36.8 -113.9 1984 305.2
Average, 29 episodes -63.5 -7.1 -74.0 320.2
Change in ratio during: Maximum: 1970-2011
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The episodes are arranged from the largest deleveraging experiences to those cases, where 
debt/GDP (or GNI) is highest four years after the exit from default. Red bars correspond to the advanced 
economies; emerging markets are shown with green bars and (fewer) yellow bars.  The latter are cases 
where there is debt reduction over the 9-year period, but there is a significant debt buildup in the four 
years following the final restructuring T to (T+4). 
The first impression from Figure 6 is that there is a vast range in variation in the debt outcomes, 
ranging from a cumulative debt reduction of 125 percent of GNI to a debt build-up of 37 percent of GNI. 
Second, the number of countries, which experienced deleveraging is considerably higher (27 episodes) 
than those ending up with a higher level of external debt (7 episodes).42 Third, it is evident that the 
observations corresponding to the advanced economies are not clustered in a particular range and, indeed, 
their experience is distributed similarly to that of emerging markets. Finally, there are three yellow bars 
flagging countries where the deleveraging was done between T-4 and T and  T to T+4 was a period of 
considerable debt build. In two of the three cases, Argentina and Ecuador, the swift post crisis 







42 The US shows no change in external debt, as it does not have any external debt over this sample. Altogether this 
brings the total number of advanced and emerging market episodes to 35. 
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 Figure 6. Default, Restructuring and External Debt: Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 
(change in debt ratio from T-4 to T+4) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011), World Bank (2013), International Debt Statistics, Washington D.C.  




V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Elsewhere, we have documented that severe financial crises in advanced economies and emerging 
markets share many similarities in terms of the severity, the macroeconomic effects and their frequent 
connection with subsequent sovereign debt crises.43 Here, we have documented that the resolution of debt 
overhangs in advanced and emerging market economies also have much in common even when they are 
separated by more than half a century. Advanced economies in the 1930s, like many modern emerging 
markets, also resorted to default and restructuring as part of their toolkit to deal with a massive debt 
overhang in economic hard times. The magnitudes of debt relief delivered from the debt write offs are of 
comparable magnitudes and, in most cases, quantitatively important (even by conservative estimates). 
As to the aftermath of restructuring, the general picture that emerges is that, once the 
restructuring is completed decisively, the economic panorama tends to improve in terms of growth, debt 
servicing burdens, debt sustainability (higher growth lower debt), and international capital market access. 
Both the advanced economy and emerging market sample provide evidence in this regard. Of course, the 
critical modifier above is “completed decisively”. Ex post it is straightforward to date that final decisive 
restructuring deal that ends the debt crisis spell. Ex-ante is another matter, as it is often difficult to 
ascertain (given that the debt sustainability calculus is crucially driven by assumptions of future growth 
and how quickly risk premia decline) whether a restructuring proposal will deliver that decisive outcome. 
The defaults on World War I debt in the summer of 1934 were decisive in the full meaning that it 
was understood that those debts would not be repaid anytime in the foreseeable future. Many, if not most, 
of the emerging market episodes, however, had a high count of debt reduction efforts that were not 
decisive; 97 restructuring deals in 35 defaults spells (a ratio of almost three to one) roughly suggests that 
prior to a final restructuring there were two “insufficient” efforts. This process of trial and error is 
typically associated with longer default spells and protracted slumps, as the empirical evidence presented 
43 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
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here shows. These observations are not meant to imply that the restructuring or default process is not 
fraught with a variety of risks including reputational issues; it is meant to suggest that the “punishment” is 
neither permanent nor even very persistent. In effect, exit from default has in a few cases been followed 
by a renewed surge in borrowing culminating in a new debt crisis within a decade of the exit of the 
previous crisis. 
Our emphasis here on debt reduction via restructuring and default is not meant to suggest that 
other forms of debt reduction were not quantitatively important in dealing with challenging debt 
overhangs as well. Fiscal retrenchment, structural reform, financial repression, and (in the case of 
domestic currency denominated debt) inflation often co-existed in these episodes of debt write-offs. 
However, the magnitude of debt relief is usually sufficiently important to be integrated in an academic 
autopsy or an ongoing policy discussion on the topic of debt overhang resolution. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to apportion to what extent the post-restructuring (or default 
exit) improvement in the economy is attributable to debt relief per se and what role other factors may 
have played. It would seem that this is a fruitful area for further investigation including revisiting the 
interwar experience following the 1934 defaults and the recovery in six European economies and the US 
that we studied here. Eichengreen (1992) has stressed the importance of stimulus provided by exits from 
the gold standard. Yet, the exits from the gold were spread over a five-year period, from the early British 
and Greek exits in 1931 to the French exit five years later in 1936. On the fiscal front, public works 
programs were initiated throughout much of the 1930s, but as with monetary policy, there was 
considerable dispersion in their timing and magnitudes. The defaults and debt write-downs were clustered 
much more closely in 1932-1934 at the trough.   
A parallel question for the emerging markets would involve sorting out to what extent the post 
restructuring recovery may be linked to the debt write-downs or to other factors—such as the sharp 
depreciations that accompany debt crises (Reinhart, 2002), as the latter may have been a force for 
restoring competitiveness and stimulating exports. In any case, controlling for the stimulus from debt 
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relief seldom forms a part of the growth accounting following debt crisis episodes. Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano (2003) suggested that for emerging markets at least restructurings played a prominent role in 
historical periods of debt reduction (or debt reversals) in emerging markets.  We would now suggest that 
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Appendix A: US Abrogation of the Gold Clause 





















Fiscal Debt relative to gold Debt relief 
 Year  outstanding (haircut, percent) Amount of haircut Nominal GDP  (haircut/GDP)
30.06.1934     27,053,141,414 40.94 11,075,556,095  1934 66,800,000,000    16.6
30.06.1933     22,538,672,560 40.94 9,227,332,546     1933 57,200,000,000    16.1
Sources: Debt from http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo3.htm
Devaluations details, Pick and Sedillot (1971), pg. 110; Nominal GDP, Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/usgdp/
Notes: January 1934 devaluation details are: from 1 troy ounce of gold =20.67 US dollars to 1 troy ounce of gold = 35.00US dollars.
We provide the debt and nominal GDP figures for 1933 and 1934 to bracket the size of the debt reduction. According to 
the League of Nations, the United States had no foreign currency debt in 1934, as such, there is no offsetting "cost"
from a higher burden of foreign currency debt following the devaluation. See also Kroszner (1999).
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Appendix B: Data  



















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
Algeria 03 / 1992 1,457 0.087 49,217     1996 3.0           1991-1996 4,657 9.9           0.054 0.5           0.5           2.0 2.0
Algeria 07 / 1996 3,200 0.235 46,941     6.8           
Argentina 08 / 1985 9,900 0.303 88,193     1993 11.2         1982-1993 67,891 28.7         0.477 13.7         24.0         n.a. n.a.
Argentina 08 / 1987 29,515 0.217 108,731   27.1         
Argentina 04 / 1993 28,476 0.325 236,520   12.0          
Argentina 04 / 2005 60,572 0.768 181,357   2005 33.4         2001-2005 60,572 33.4         0.425 14.2         14.2         n.a. n.a.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 / 1997 1,300 0.896 5,281       1998 24.6         1992-1997 1,300 24.6         0.896 22.1         22.1         n.a. n.a.
Brazil 02 / 1983 4,452 -0.098 146,702   1994 3.0           1983-1994 130,493 23.9         0.375 9.0           14.3         6.7 8.3
Brazil 01 / 1984 4,846 0.017 145,992   3.3           
Brazil 09 / 1986 6,671 0.192 268,846   2.5           
Brazil 11 / 1988 62,100 0.184 326,902   19.0         
Brazil 11 / 1992 9,167 0.270 390,586   2.3           
Brazil 04 / 1994 43,257 0.293 546,487   7.9           
Bulgaria 06 / 1994 7,910 0.563 8,013       1994 98.7         1990-1994 7,910 98.7         0.563 55.6         55.6         55.6 55.6
Chile 11 / 1983 2,169 0.007 21,016     1990 10.3         1983-1990 21,731 64.8         0.379 24.6         35.6         17.7 23.3
Chile 01 / 1984 1,160 0.084 20,437     5.7           
Chile 04 / 1986 6,007 0.317 18,839     31.9         
Chile 06 / 1987 5,901 0.143 22,219     26.6         
Chile 12 / 1990 6,494 0.170 33,546     19.4         
Costa Rica 09 / 1983 609 0.394 3,147       1990 19.4         1983-1990 2,433 42.6         0.791 33.7         43.4         29.0         30.8
Costa Rica 05 / 1985 440 0.356 3,923       11.2         
Costa Rica 05 / 1990 1,384 0.719 5,710       24.2         
Croatia 07 / 1996 858 0.110 23,380     1996 3.7           1992-1996 858 3.7           0.11 0.4           0.4           0.4 0.7
Dominican Rep. 02 / 1986 823 0.499 7,883       1994 10.4         1982-1994 1,910 13.6         0.731 9.9           13.3         n.a. n.a.
Dominican Rep. 08 / 1994 1,087 0.505 14,094     7.7           
Dominican Rep. (Bond) 05 / 2005 1,100 0.047 33,533     2005 3.3           2005 1,280 3.8           0.016 0.1           0.1           n.a. n.a.
Dominican Rep (Bank) 10 / 2005 180 0.113 33,533     0.5           
Dominica 09 / 2004 144 0.540 361           2005 39.9         2003-2005 144 39.9         0.54 21.6         21.6         21.6 21.6
Ecuador 10 / 1983 970 0.063 15,431     1995 6.3           1982-1995 12,714 54.3         0.512 27.8         31.2         n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 08 / 1984 350 0.057 16,423     2.1           
Ecuador 12 / 1985 4,224 0.154 19,206     22.0         
Ecuador 02 / 1995 7,170 0.422 23,427     30.6         
Ecuador 08 / 2000 6,700 0.383 18,685     2000 35.9         1999-2000 6,700 35.9 0.334 12.0         12.0         n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 06 / 2009 3,190 0.677 57,859     2009 5.5           2008-2009 3,190 5.5 0.528 2.9           2.9           n.a. n.a.
Gabon 12 / 1987 39 0.079 3,535       1994 1.1           1986-1994 226 5.3           0.054 0.3           0.3           0.8 0.8
Gabon 05 / 1994 187 0.162 4,265       4.4           
Grenada 11 / 2005 210 0.339 695           30.2         2004-2005 210 30.2 0.339 10.2         10.2         
Jamaica 09 / 1978 63 0.022  1990 1978-1993 1,452 31.1         0.516 16.1 24.4 14.7 17.8
Jamaica 04 / 1979 149 0.035
Jamaica 06 / 1981 89 0.152 2,817       3.2           
Jamaica 06 / 1984 165 0.181 2,119       7.8           
Jamaica 09 / 1985 369 0.317 1,993       18.5         
Jamaica 05 / 1987 285 0.328 2,672       10.7         
Jamaica 06 / 1990 332 0.440 4,663       7.1           
Jordan 12 / 1993 1,289 0.546 5,532       1993 23.3         1989-1993 1,289 23.3         0.227 5.3 5.3
Macedonia, FYR 03 / 1997 229 0.346 3,735       1997 6.1           1992-1997 229 6.1           0.346 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9
Mexico 08 / 1983 18,800 -0.002 172,160   1990 10.9         1982-1990 177,771 61.8         0.42 25.9 36.2 13.1 19.5
Mexico 03 / 1985 28,600 0.022 215,443   13.3         
Mexico 08 / 1985 20,100 0.054 215,443   9.3           
Mexico 03 / 1987 52,300 0.181 163,581   32.0         
Mexico 03 / 1988 3,671 0.563 200,119   1.8           
Mexico 02 / 1990 54,300 0.305 287,803   18.9         
Panama 10 / 1985 579 0.120 5,402       1996 10.7         1983-1996 4,967 53.3         0.389 20.7 22.9 16.9 19.8
Panama 08 / 1994 452 0.151 7,734       5.8           
Panama 05 / 1996 3,936 0.349 9,322       42.2         
Peru 01 / 1980 340 -0.046 20,649     1997 1.6           1980-1997 11,320 19.1         0.64 12.2 13.8 11.4 11.5
Peru 07 / 1983 380 0.063 19,291     2.0             
Peru 03 / 1997 10,600 0.639 59,214     17.9         
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Table B1 (continued). Middle-High Income External Debt Restructuring Episodes, 1978-2010 
 
Sources: Individual episodes dates, debt affected, preferred haircut, full epidode haircut from Cruces and Trebesch; 
full episode haircut not previously published. GDP in US dollars from World Economic Outlook, April 2013; full 


















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
Poland 04 / 1982 1,957 0.406 65,187     1994 3.0           1981-1994 30,912 29.8         n.a. n.a. 15.1 15.1 17.7
Poland 11 / 1982 2,225 0.629 65,187     3.4           
Poland 11 / 1983 1,192 0.525 75,406     1.6           
Poland 07 / 1984 1,390 0.269 75,507     1.8           
Poland 09 / 1986 1,970 0.375 73,677     2.7           
Poland 07 / 1988 8,441 0.244 68,612     12.3         
Poland 07 / 1989 206 0.120 66,895     0.3           
Poland 10 / 1994 13,531 0.490 103,683   13.1         
Romania 12 / 1982 1,598 0.329 54,819     1983 2.9           1981-1986 2,965 6.2           0.158 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.6
Romania 06 / 1983 567 0.317 47,915     1.2           
Romania 09 / 1986 800 0.123 51,765     1986 1.5              
Russia 12 / 1997 30,500 0.262 404,938   2000 7.5           1991-2000 68,683 26.4         0.495 13.1 11.3 9.6 11.1
Russia (GKOs) 03 / 1999 4,933 0.460 195,907   2.5            
Russia (MinFin3) 02 / 2000 1,307 0.515 259,716   0.5           
Russia (PRINs/IANs) 08 / 2000 31,943 0.508 259,716   12.3         
Serbia & Montenegro 07 / 2004 2,700 0.709 23,537     2004 11.5         2003-2004 2,700 11.5 0.709 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.4
Seychelles 02 / 2010 320 0.562 973           2010 32.9         2008-2010 320 32.9 0.562 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.7
Slovenia 06 / 1995 812 0.033 20,971     1995 3.9           1992-1996 812 3.9 0.033 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
South Africa 03 / 1987 10,900 0.085 85,792     1993 12.7         1985-1993 23,400 17.9         0.377 6.8 9.2 2.9 2.9
South Africa 10 / 1989 7,500 0.127 95,979     7.8               
South Africa 09 / 1993 5,000 0.220 130,448   3.8               
Trinidad & Tobago 12 / 1989 446 0.155 4,323       1989 10.3         1988-1989 446 10.3 0.155 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.0
Turkey 06 / 1979 429 0.222 1982 1978-1982 5,067 5.8           0.316 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.5
Turkey 08 / 1979 2,269 0.195
Turkey 08 / 1981 100 0.086 95,496     0.1           
Turkey 03 / 1982 2,269 0.170 86,766     2.6           
Uruguay 07 / 1983 575 0.007 5,609       1991 10.3         1983-1991 5,913 47.8         0.46 22.0 34.3 n.a. n.a.
Uruguay 07 / 1986 1,958 0.243 6,470       30.3         
Uruguay 03 / 1988 1,770 0.203 8,375       21.1         
Uruguay 01 / 1991 1,610 0.263 12,376     13.0         
Uruguay 05 / 2003 3,127 0.098 12,046     2003 26.0         2003 3,127 26.0         0.079 2.1 2.1 n.a. n.a.
Venezuela 02 / 1986 20,307 0.099 60,878     1990 33.4         1983-1990 60,230 124.5       0.387 48.2 41.6 19.6 27.9
Venezuela 09 / 1988 20,338 0.043 60,379     33.7         
Venezuela 12 / 1990 19,585 0.367 48,393     40.5          
Averages       7,889 0.270       79,299           13.8          20,738           30.2           0.39           13.6           15.7 
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Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest level of credit 
risk. 
 
Aa Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk. 
 
A Obligations rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk. 
 
Baa Baa Obligations rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate credit risk and 
as such may possess certain speculative characteristics. 
 
Ba Obligations rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial credit risk. 
 
B B Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. 
 
Caa Obligations rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to very high 
credit risk. 
 
Ca Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some 
prospect of recovery of principal and interest. 
 
C Obligations rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for 
recovery of principal or interest. 
 
Source: Moodys’ (2013). 
Note: Moody’s appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa. 
The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 
indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating 
category. Additionally, a “(hyb)” indicator is appended to all ratings of hybrid securities issued by banks, insurers, 
finance companies, and securities firms.* 
* By their terms, hybrid securities allow for the omission of scheduled dividends, interest, or principal payments, 
which can potentially result in impairment if such an omission occurs. Hybrid securities may also be subject to 
contractually allowable write-downs of principal that could result in impairment.  
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AAA Highest credit quality.  AAA’ ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in 
cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be 
adversely affected by foreseeable events.  
AA Very high credit quality.  ‘AA’ ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong 
capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.  
A High credit quality.  ‘A’ ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial 
commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or 
economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.  
BBB Good credit quality.  ‘BBB’ ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low. The capacity for 
payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse business or economic conditions are more 
likely to impair this capacity.  
BB Speculative. ‘BB’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse 
changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial flexibility exists which 
supports the servicing of financial commitments. . 
B Highly speculative. ‘B’ ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. 
Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to 
deterioration in the business and economic environment. 
CCC Substantial credit risk. Default is a real possibility.  
CC Very high levels of credit risk.  Default of some kind appears probable.  
C Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. Default is imminent or inevitable, or the issuer is in standstill. Conditions 
that are indicative of a ‘C’ category rating for an issuer include: a. the issuer has entered into a grace or cure period 
following non-payment of a material financial obligation; b. the issuer has entered into a temporary negotiated 
waiver or standstill agreement following a payment default on a material financial obligation; or c. Fitch Ratings 
otherwise believes a condition of ‘RD’ or ‘D’ to be imminent or inevitable, including through the formal 
announcement of a distressed debt exchange.  
RD Restricted default. ‘RD’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings’ opinion has experienced an uncured 
payment default on a bond, loan or other material financial obligation but which has not entered into bankruptcy 
filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, and which has not 
otherwise ceased operating. This would include: a. the selective payment default on a specific class or currency of 
debt; b. the uncured expiry of any applicable grace period, cure period or default forbearance period following a 
payment default on a bank loan, capital markets security or other material financial obligation; c. the extension of 
multiple waivers or forbearance periods upon a payment default on one or more material financial obligations, 
either in series or in parallel; or d. execution of a distressed debt exchange on one or more material financial 
obligations. 
D Default. ‘D’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings’ opinion has entered into bankruptcy filings, 
administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, or which has otherwise ceased 
business. Default ratings are not assigned prospectively to entities or their obligations; within this context, non-
payment on an instrument that contains a deferral feature or grace period will generally not be considered a default 
until after the expiration of the deferral or grace period, unless a default is otherwise driven by bankruptcy or other 
similar circumstance, or by a distressed debt exchange.  “Imminent” default typically refers to the occasion where 
a payment default has been intimated by the issuer, and is all but inevitable. This may, for example, be where an 
issuer has missed a scheduled payment, but (as is typical) has a grace period during which it may cure the payment 
default. Another alternative would be where an issuer has formally announced a distressed debt exchange, but the 
date of the exchange still lies several days or weeks in the immediate future. In all cases, the assignment of a 
default rating reflects the agency’s opinion as to the most appropriate rating category consistent with the rest of its 
universe of ratings, and may differ from the definition of default under the terms of an issuer’s financial 
obligations or local commercial practice.  
 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2013). 
Note:  The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. 
Such suffixes are not added to the ‘AAA’ Long-Term IDR category, or to Long-Term IDR categories below ‘B’.  
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/pubsto/quastoeco/QSE_18;internal&action=_setlanguage.action?LANGUA




Table B4. Additional Data Sources 










Global Financial Data, 1924-1937 
Belgium BNB, Centre d'études économiques de la KUL, 1835-2005 
Finland Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1860-
2001http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts 
France Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1815-1938 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts 
Germany Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1850-2006 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts 
Greece Kostelenos (2003), 1830-1939 
Italy Francese and Pace (2008) 1861-2006 
United Kingdom MeasuringWorth, http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php 
1830-2011 





Exchange rates,  Historical Statistics of the United States and United Nations (1948); 1932-1934 
  
WWI debts owed to 
United States 
Bailey (1950), Loyd (1933), United Nations (1948), US Treasury (1920, 1933) and US 
Treasury Annual Reports (various issues), Moody’s Manuals on Foreign and American 
Government Securities (various issues), Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932 
  
WWI debts owed to 
France and UK 
League of Nations (various issues), United Nations (1948), Moody’s Manuals (various 
issues) 
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